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' Helpful discussions with lan Parry are grxtefully acknowledgecl.l. Introduction
In msny counlrim: envinmrncntrl lxdicy ix high on the political agenda. Unfortunately, moet of the
time the debate is cast in a partial setting even though environmeotal policy has importaot implicatione for
public finance and macroeconomica. 71a interactioo between public finaoce aod aovironmeotal policy is
especially rolevant u taxes serve the dual purpoee of, aa the one hand, financing a àmable pubGc axtor,
and, an the other hand, intemalising environmaual externalitiea (cf. Sandmo, 1975). A greater coecern with
environmattal quslity ('graener' proferonces) implies that the nondistortionary level of the tax nte aimed at
internalíaing extemnlities (i.e. the pollution tax) riaes. if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply
is poaitive, this rndua~e the marginal coat of public funds. In this connxtion, a crucial quedion ia whether
greener proferoncas facilitata a higher level of public consumption goods. Mother importaot policy isaue ia
whethu the smaller distortionary lovel of the tax rate induced bY greaner Proferences booets employment.
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1992) show that greener proferences genenlly induce a drop in ecooomic
activity and employment. Mornover, a grater concem for the environment raises public consumption only
if substitution between cloan and dirty activities ia difficult and the marginal productivity of abatement tapers
off rapiJly. 71tey asxuma thal prefernncarc aro sapanble in private consumption and leiauro on the one óand,
and public conaumption and envirunmenlal quality on the olher hand. Hence, public consumption doea not
ditectly crowd out private consumption aod labour supply. This paper, in contnst, allows for oon-s~anble
proferences in the form of substitutioo batween private and public conaumption. It atudia the implícatiaos of
diroct crowding out of private conaumption and labour supply for optimal taxation, provià~ of public
gixxls and envinmmcnul pdicy. In particular, wro invextigata under what circumatsncea groener proferatcoe
can yield a'aocial' or an 'employment' double dividend in the senso that a cleaner environment is
compatible with, reapectively, a higher level of public consumption gooda or a higher level of employment.
Soction 2 analyces lhe effecta of taxation and diroct crowding out on labour auppty and private
consumption and also considera the effecta on the govenuaent budget constraint. Soctioo 3 deriva optimal
governm~t policy, paying paAicular attention to public consumption, public abatement, the marginal oost of
public funds, and the distortionary and aondistortioouy levela of the tas rate, Sectien 4 theo diacusaes how
changes in the tax rate and the marginal cost of public funda affect public conaumption, labour apply and
the quality of the environment. Section S solves for the optimal tax rate and the marginal caat of public
funds by deriving the cost and demand curves for public gooda. Section 6 considan the implicatiaaa of a
greater preference for public consumption while section 7 atudies the conaequences of groener profereoces.
Section B concludes.
2. Uin~ct truwding uul uf privale cortxunptiun and Irbuur suPPly
The roproaauative hnusehold roceives income from employmaot (~L whero )i denotes the coeafant
producer wage and L standa for hours worketl). After-taa income (~(1-t)L whero t derwtes the tax nue)
muá then equal pmate consumption (C). Households derive utility from private consumptioa (C), laisuro
(Vm 1-L), public conaumption (G) and environmattal quality (E). Since we focua on diroct crowding out in
am.wmption, we wiceume perf~:t auF~..titution in utility hetwecn private and public conaumption. 7itia seome
reaeonable for apending on alucation, health care, law and order, aod care for the elderly (cf. Peltrann,2
1973; Buiter, 1977). We also a.ccume that environmental quality ia separable from the otber componenta of
utility, M~ that the utility functinn can he writtcn as:
U e. M(CtYcG. V) f Ys E. Ys~O (1)
wóe,re yc and ys denote the prefere,nce weights given to public coosumption and the quality of the eaviron-
ment, respectively. The sub-utility function M(J is conave and weakly homothUia Houadwlds aro
atomiaYic and thus take tha wage, the tax rate and environmattal quality es given. Householda thue equste
the marginal rate of substitutioo between conaumptian gooda and leiauro to the consumer wage (i.e. w~(1-
t~, eo tlnt MvlMc~w where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Together witb the óousehold budgd
constraint, thia yields expn~sions for private coosumption, Iebour supply and indirect private utility:
C-c(w.YcG), LL((w.YcG). M-m(`N.YoG). (2)
Loglineu deviationa from a benchmark aro denotod by a tilde (e.g. C.dCIC), unleas indicated otherwiae.
Loglinearisation of (2) then yields:
C~{1 tt..) ~- fo (Yc tG). L ~-E.. t - ta (Yo tG).
M 3(1-ew) l(1-r.i) (i'ctG) - rw tl (2')
whero t.dt!(1-t), OG~.G(CfYoG)G 1 denotes the share of private consumption in the total besket of
priwte and public consumption, and OGw, ~mVl(mV fL)G 1. The uncompensated wage elasticity of labour
supply is givea by F„a(a-~rk,r„Im,where a ropresents the aubstitution elasticity between private consumption
and leisuro in suh-utility function M(J. A higher tax rate lowers tha consumnr waga and induces aubstitution
away from conaumplion of goods to leisure, so that labour supply falls. However, a highor tax tate alao
eocourages agmts to work more hours in order to make up for the fall in after-tax income. If the fuxt
(substitution) effect dominatea the aecond (income) effect, i.e. if a7~r, the uncompensated wage elaaticity of
labour supply is positive, so that a higher tax nte lowers both Isbour supply and the level oF indirect private
utitity.~
The elasticity of labour supply with respect to the level of public consumption ia givea by
eo3(l-oik.~,lm70. Hence, a high level of public consumption depreases both private consumption and
labour wpply. More public provision of consumption goods reduces the noed for private coosumption goods
and induces households to work less hours while the level of private utility risa. Thia phmommon u caUod
direct crowding out (cf. Buiter, 1977).
' S~x Ilausman (1985) for nwrc JCtailx on taxatinn and labour supply.3
It is useful to note that a higher tax nte inducea substitution away from conaumptioa goods towards
leisure and thus nises the marginal private utility ofprivate consumption:
Mc s tuv t. (3)
We assume full employment. t~utput (i.e. Y-QNL where N dwotea the number of houaeholds)
must equal toW demand for products (i.e. Y~NCtGtA whero A denotes the levd of abateatmt
uodertaken by the govemment). We thtu aasume that output is proportiooal to employtttent aod ehat
producer prices and the producor wage aro fixed. Decreasing retums to acale in production doea not affect
the resttlu as long as puro profita aro taxed avwy and producer prices rasult from competitive b~aviour
(Auerbach, 1985).
Loglinearisetion of the gooda market equilibrium condition or, equivalently the govemmeat budgat
coostraiot (i.e. GtAat~NL) yields:
ay~ C t m„ Á-(1-t) t t t L~ (1-t-ec„) i- t~ ('y~,tG) (4)
whero vbraGlY snd m~.A~Y define the ttational income shares of public consumption and pubtic
sbatement, respectively. The change in total public spending must thus oqual the change in public rovmuea.
Tha first term on the last right-hand side of (4) consists of a direct effxt of a higher tax rate ~ tax
revenuea (i.e. l-t) plus an indirect effect arising from the induced change in labour supply and the tax base
(rt,.l). Clearly, if the wage elasticity of labour wpply is positive, a higher tax rate erodes the tax base. To
rule out a downward-sloping Laffer curve, we assume 1-t-te„10. The sacond term on the lart right-hand
aide of (4) stands for the erosion of the tax base and the consaquent drop in tax rovenuea arising from the
adverse effect of public consumption on labour supply. This cortespoods to tho oegative effect of diroct
crowding out on tlte tax base and thus governttknt revenuea.
Potlution is an inevitable by-product of procluction, hence environmental quality woraooe u the
levels of production and thus emissions rise. However, environmental quality can ba enhanced through
public abatement, albeit under decreasing retums. We assume that environmental quality is given by:
E- e(A) - a Y, e' 10, e't0 (S)
when: a denotes the emission-output ratio. The Appendix shows that private abstement in combination with
a Ixdlution Iax yielJs yualilativcly similar results.
3. Optimal gorertunent policy
The govemment maximisea social welfare:4
NU a N im(11(1-t).YaG) f Yele(A)-aRN1(6(f-t).yoG)l}
suhject to the huJgel cunstraint tJTNI((1(I-t),ycC' i)-GfA. "I'he govemment haa nu access to lump-sum taxea
and subsidi~. The tax rete Ihus faces the dwl task of, on tho one hand, reising public rovenues to finance
public consumption anJ public abatement, and, on the other hand, internalising pollution extamalities.
Hencc, we face a second-best prohlem in public finance.
3.1. Pubdc mnsumprion
The first.onler condition for the level of public consumption yields:
N yo s O I f t(t-4J Eci~cl (ó)
where q denotes the marginal cost of public funds (i.e. Ihe social marginal disutility of raising an extre unit
of public revenue, p, dividecl by the margiwl utility of privata consumption, Ivtc), and tN stands for the non-
distortionary level of the tu rete (see expression (7) in section 3.2). The Samuelson rule for the optimal
provisioo of public goods assumea that lump-sum taxes are available and states that the sum of the aurgioal
rates of substitution betweeo public and private cottsumption goods (Ny~ should equal the marginal rato of
trensformation (i.e. unity). Eqwtion (ti) modifiea the Samuelson tule for the presetux of distortionsry
taxation (t1t„). In perticular, the price of public consumption in terms of private consumption gooda (tite
right-hwtJ siJe ul' (6)) c:an Jillbr from thn correslwnding nwrginal rate uf' transfurmation for two reasons
(cf. Atkinson and Stam, 1974). First, the rttarginal cost of public funds can differ from one (see exptession
(9) in section 3.3). Second, the fact that public consumption crowds out labour supply (EC70) and thw
deptesses the base of the distortionary tu (i.e. t-tN~O) reises the relative price of public consumption abova
Iha marginal ctrst of puhlic fimJ..`
An elternative interpretation of (6) is that society is more willing to pay a óigh tnargittal cost of
ptblic funds (rl) if the preferenca for public consumption (yo) is high. If the tax rete (t) is high md tàe ~on-
distortionary level of the tax rete (y,) is low, the distortiorury tax rete (t-t„) is large. In that case, the
erosion of the distortionary tax bese due to direct crowding out implies a relatively Iarge gap between, tw
the one hand, the price of public consumption and, on the other hand, the cost of public funds. Heace, if
the disiortionary tu rete is high, society is less willing to pay a high marginal coet of public funds for a
given preference for public consumption. Loglinearisation of the modified Samuelsoo tule (tí) yielda:
~I L Yc -(~d~cNYc) [(t-t) t- 41 tNl (6')
where we assume that changes in tolmo are ínsignificant.
' Note that the price of puhlic consumption is unity, if the distortionary tax is uro (t-tN). In that case,
the marginal cost of public funds is unity (see expression (9)).S
3.2. Nondisrorrionary kvel ofrhe ra: rate and public abatement
The nonáistortionary level of the tax nte ia defined as followt::
tN ~ NY~iP ~ (NY~iMc) (lirl). (~)
The textbook Pigovian tax nte (tP) is the sum of the marginal environmental damages of praluction divided
by tho marginal utility of private income to convert from utílity units into unita of production, i.e.
tr~NYtalMc. The nondistortionary (or externality-corrocting) level of tho tax nte is the Pigoviaa tu nte
rrla dividul by lhc marginal cost of public funds (y~-tJp). Hence, as public funds becumo scarcer (higher
q) the govemment can lass afford to intenalise environmatW extemalities and muat pay more attmtioa to
the objective of niaing public rovenues. Making use of (3), we can loglinearise (7) aa follows:
tx - Ye f à-~v t- Ó. (7')
The nondistortionary level of the tax nte thus increases with both the priority society attaches to a clean
environment and the emissionoutput ntio but declines with the tax nte and the marginal cost of public
(unds.
7be optimal level of public abstema~t follows from equating the social marginal utility of public
abatement, NYre'(A), to the social marginal disutility af raising public revenue, p. Making use of (~, we
find that the marginal pra)uctivily of public abatement rises with the emission-output ntio and dxlines witó
the non-distortionary level of the tax nte (particularly if the productivity of public abatemeat does aot drop
off npidly, i.e. if the ela,Wicity a„~-Ae"(A)le'(A)~0 is small):
e'(A) ~ altr~ or À a(tN-á)lo~. (8)
Substitulion of (7') into (B) give.c:
A - IYE " ~v t - nlloA. (8~)
Public abetement thus increa.ses if prcferences become greener or the tax nte (and the marginal uNlity of
private income) falls. Public ahrternent is financal through taxation. Hence, less abatercent is provided if
the marginal cost of puhlic funds rises.
3.3. 7be rax rate and the marginal msr ojpublicjunds
The first-order condition for the optimal tax rate is:
- 1`IRnL t NY~R'NI., - - IrifNL t pt~N!".6
Dividing by -NQLMc and making use of Roy'a identity (i.e. m„aLMc) and t„s'wl„IL. yielda the following
exprcasion for lhe margiul cost of public funds:
A~ MIMc ~ II-((t-4i)~(1-t)) E.]'~. (9)
Wa assume that changes in tha wage elaaticity of labour aupply aro small and inaignificant (E„~0).
Accordingly, loglinarisation of (9) yields:
v- I~J(1-~)1 I(1-t~) t- tN tN]- (9')
If the uncompensatod wage elasticity of labour supply is positive (q,10, o7ar) and the tu nte excoeds ita
non-distortionary level (t 1 t„), the margiul coat of public funds exceeds the marginal rate of transfotttntioo
betwxa public aod private consumption (i.o. unity). A higher ux nte or a lower noa-distortionary level of
the tu rate (i.e. a higlwr distortionary tu nue, t-y,) msgnifies the deadweight loseos of tuation and niaes
the margiul coat of public funds if the labour supply curve elopas upwarda (E„~0). If aubatitution and
incomo effects of higher consumer wages on labour aupply cancel out (a~vr), the marginal cost of public
funds coincidea with the margiul nte of transfortution between public and private consumption. In that
case, a labour tu acts as a lump-sum tu.
4. Public rnrnumplion, labtntr supply and environmental qtality
Tàis aection expresses govemment conaumption, employment, end environmental quality in terms
of the tax rate and the margiul coat of public funda. Subatituting (8') into the govemment budgat oonatraint
(4) and s~ilving (nr the change in puhlie amxumptiem, we obtain:
(rvottE~ G - (1-t-~,.tt(~„~a„ha„] i t (~,,~a,J (n-i'~ -~o i'o. (ltl)
Upoa subáitutiao of (10) into (2'), we obtain the changa in labour aupply:
1- m-tfcl(~c}~c)1 {j l-ttt.(máEC)t(ar~la„knv] 't t(trxlax) (itrY~ t oto Yc}. (I 1)
Equations (10) and (11) can he interpretecl as follows. A highar tu rate raises the level of public consump-
tioo, diroctly and also óecausa it makes environmental policy less ambitious by depresaing the level of
public abatemart (cE (8')). A higher tu rata reducea labour supply dirxtly if the wbatitution effed
dominates the income effact (i.e. alvt), but also indiractly due to direct crowding out. A higher taargiul
cost of public funds or a smaller priority to environmental quality makea eavironmattal poGcy leas
ambitious by roducing public abatematt, theroby cnutting more room for public wnsumption. The
rallacation away from public consumption to public consumption crowds out labour supply and thue~
reduccN hdh nutpul anJ emixsions. A higher priority for public conNUmplion inducox diroct crowding out
and lhua retlucex latxwr xupply.
Ucing (2'), (7) and (8), we can write the change in environmental quality as:
asE s ~AA-eH Ià-E~t-EO(Yc}G)1 (~2)
where ac~tNElaY deuotes the aocial value of environmental qwlity in terms of national income. Environ-
menW q-,ility improves if public abatoment risea or the emissionoutput ntio falls. The eavironment also
improvea if the value of public consumption risea, i.e. if diroct crowding out depresses labour supply end
ecaamic activity. If the wage elasticity of labour supply is positivo, a higher tax nte depresses labour
supply, output and emissions and thus improves the quality of the environment as well. Substitution of (8')
and ( l0) into (12) yields:
ax E a-tN ~} I((VAlQAx~Gf(t-tN)EG)!(~Gf~G)) (YE-O) tltNfG~G!(WOt~O)J YO
t {lEC4i(1-ttc„~lEC)-(wAlaA)urvwc)I(~ctttc)} Í. (12')
The effect ofa higher tax nte on envimnmental ywlity is ambiguous. If the fall in public aba[ement is Iargo
(i.e. if oA is small), diroct crowding out is weak, and the substitution elasticity helween leisure and
commoditirs (a) is small, so that the fall in output and emissions is smrll (cc and E, are small), mviroo-
mental quality deteriontes, otherwise the environment improves. A higher priority for public consumption
depresses economic sctivity and emissions and thw improves the quality of the environment.
S. Cost and dtanand for puhlic Aoods
Thix secticm xulves fi~r the optinwl tax nte and the marginal cost of public funds. Substituting (7')
into (9'), using (9), and solving for q gives the cost curve (see Figure 1):
~1 - IE.!(I-t-f.t)1 I(1-tN(I-w)) t - tN (Yet~)1. (9')
A highu rwlional inlnm,; ,harC nf p~hh~ xpc.nding rai.e., the dixlortionary tax rrte (i.e. the wexlge between
the sctwl and lhe nonrlixtortionary leval of the tax nte), both directly es the ovenll tax nte (t) is higher
and indirectly as it redua~ lhe non-distortionary level of the tax nte (aeo (7')). If the uncompensated wage
elasticity of Iabour supply is positive (a7r.r), the marginal cost of public funds rises with the diatortioaary
tax nte and thw the size of the public sector (see (9')). A greater concern for environmental qwli[y (y810)
or a higher emissiomoutput ntio (à70) nises the non-distortionary level of the tax nte and thus ahifts
down tha cost curve if the lahour supply curve slopes upwards. Note that a zero wage elasticity of labour
supply (o-rv) corrwKmds lo a I)at cust curve (ij-0 as p- I).8
Substitution of (7') into the modified Samuelson rule (tí') yields the demand curve for public
consumption (also see Figure 1):
~1 z IYG f EOGtN (Y6}a)' EGG(t-t~tN~V) t]I(Ii~ECGtN) (6")
~ere Eoc~rfEC~~oNYo10. Society is willing to pay a highor margvul cost ofpublic funda if the profermce
for public consumption rises. To the extent that direct crowding out occurs, the cost of public funda rise8
with a lower ux rate, a higher emis.cion-output ntio and greener prekroncea. Effectively, a nare ambitious
environmental policy raises the non-distortionary level of the tax rate. This reducea the wedge (due to direct
crowding out) between the price of public ceosumption (aee (6)) and the cost of public funds. In genenl,
the demend curve slopes downwarrls and shifts out when there is an increase in the priority given to
environmental qwlity (y~, the preference for public consumption (ye), or the emission-output rntio (a).
The special case of no direct crowding out (c~s0) cornesponds to a flat demand curve (qaya).
Intersection of the cast curve and the demand curve (i.e. solving (tí") and (9")) yields exprrasions
for the optimal changea in the lax rate and the tnarginal cost of public funds:
~ t z ri(1-t-Evt) YC t IEGG(t-t)}~r)tN (YEfa)
0~1 -~rl l-tN(1-WV)1 YI: t rlN:(t-tN)~tNEr (Yli}a)
where ~~ Rr.l l t tH(~v f(t-4~ k,.:) I t E,:u( I-[x 1-t t t,~v)10.'
(13)
(14)
6. A greater prefererr~e for public cunsumption ga~
A greater preference for public consumption goods (yc10) leaves the cast curve unaffected, but
shifts Ihe demand curve out. The equilihrium shifts from E to E', so that the tax rate rises and, if the wage
elrsticity of IaMwr supply is Ixisitive, Ihe marginal cosl ol' puhlic funds risav as well (see Figure I or (13)
and (14)). As a result, the govemment can Izss afford to use the tax rata to correct for pollution extemalitiea
and [hus the non-distartionary level of the tsx rate and the level of public abatement fall (aea (7') and (g')).
Public consumption also rises bexause the tax nte and hence govemment revenues rise (see (10)). Effectiva
ly, the govemment substitutes public consumption for public abatement. Higher public consumption dircctly
crowds out privata consumption anJ lalxwr supply anJ thux reduces oconomic activity. The higher tax nte
also Jinxtly dapm.k. ~s lahewr supply anJ thus economic activity if the lahour supply curve slopes upwards.
Thero are lhnx effaxts em environmenlal yuality (see (12')). FiN, public ahatement falls. Second, economic
activity and emissions decline on account of Jiroct crowding out. Third, activity end emissions fall due to
the higher tax nle. Hence, if labour supply is fairly inelastic wi[h respect to the after-tax wage, diroct
' A positive value of 0 is, in fact, a secondorcler condition for govemment policy. It implies that, if
c,.GO, the demand curve ia ateeper than the cost curve.9
crowding out is weak, and public abatement remains fairly effoctive (i.e. small t~, co, a~), a gnxter
preference for public consumption deteriontes environmental quality as emisaiooa ara ~ot nduced
suhstantially while abatnment is harm~xl a lot. However, if Ihe productivity of abetement tapers off npidly
while direct and indirect crowding out are significant, a higher priority for public coosumptioo may mhance
eavironmental quality. ]ntuitively, the level of oconomic activity ia substantially reduced while ita
composition does not become much dirtier.
7. Conseynatces of Rreener preGxenoes
A greater concem for environmental quality (ya~0) shifts out both the cost curve and the demand
curve, so tlnt the equilibrium movea from E to E'. Groener preferencea raise the oondiatortiotuuy level of
the tax nte. This nises the ovenll tax nte (t) and thereforo the national income share of public speading
(see (13)). Intuitively, a higher non-distortionary tax nte allows a higher ovenll tax nte because both the
cost of puhlic funds (9) and the impact of diroct crowding out on the prico of public consumption (IS) depend
on the gap betwuen the ovenll and the non-distortionary tax nte (i.e. the distortionary tax nte, t-G). How
much the tax rate rises for a given green preference shock depends on tho siu of the uncompeoaated wage
elasticity of labour supply (~) relative to the imporunce of direct crowding out (u indicatod by ~. T~
expansion of the size of public sector is largest if the uncompettsated wage elasticity is small while ditact
crowding out is important. The reason is that a larger tax nte is less effective in offsetting the impact of a
higher nonàistortionary tax nte on the price of public consumption if the uncompensated wage elasticity of
labour supply is small relativo to the elasticity ea.
If the uncompensatul wage elasticity and the distortionary tax nte are positivo (i.e. E.,(t-ta)10), the
marginal cost of public funds rises as prefarences become greener (sce expression (14)). in that caeo, the
higher ovenll tax nta exerts a larger positive impact on tho msrginal cost of public funds (9) than on the
price of public consumption (tí). Hence, the marginal cost of public funds rises to offset the negative effect
of the higher non-distortionary tax ntC on the price of public consumption.'
The ovenll effect of gnxner preferences on the level of public consumption is ambiguous. An the
otte hand, thc expansion of the public sector associated with the higher tax nte benefits public conaumption.
t),t the other hand, higher public abatement (8') crowds out the other category of public spending, i.e.
public consumption. Acconlingly, where.as public consumption can rise on account of the positive effect oa
the levd of public spending, it may fall due the change in the mmposirion of public spending toward public
ahatement anJ away fmm puhlic conwmption. 71te impnrtance nf the ~cond effect Je~ends on the elasticity
a~. ]f the praluctivity uf abatement tapen offquickly (i.e. s large value for o~), public abatem~t does not
rise much. Hence, the level effect offads the composition effect and public consumption risea.
If public consumption rises, employment declines for two reasons. First, diroct crowding out
' Bovenhrrg and van der Ploeg (1992) do not allow for direct crowding out, so that grenner preferencea
do not affccl the price of public consumption and thus redUCC thC marginal cost of public funda if the
uncompensated wagc elasticity of lalxwr supply is positive.10
reduces labour supply as public conaumption substitutea for private consumption. Second, if the labour
supply curve slopes upwarda, the higher tax nte causes houaeholds to substitute away from coawmption
toward leiaure.
In case the productivity of public abatement dxlinas npidly, there exists a'aocial' double dividend
in the senae that both environmental qwlity and public consumption expand. However, employment and
economic activity dacline. Hence, there is no 'employment' double dividend in the form of a simultaneow
riae of employment and arvironmental qwlity. Intuitively, if the productivity of sbatament falla off quickly,
the environment improvea not so much through a higher level of abatement but rather through a lowor levd
of emissions Jue to a lower level uf exonomic activity and employmnnt. Accurdingly, the higha lavel of
environmental quality is achieval by roducing the l~el of economic activity rather than making the
compasirion of economic activity cleaner.
Bovnnberg anc! van der Ploeg (1992) found that greener prekrences never expand employmmt.
However, they al~stracted from dir~oct crowding out by assuming thet public wnaumption was aepanble
from private consumption in social utility. This paper, in contrast, finds that more concern for the eoviron-
mmt may baost employment if private and public consumption aro close substitutes so that diroct crowding
out occurs. In particular, for employment to rise, two conditions must he met. First, tbe productivity of
abatement must drop off only slowly (small o,~. This eosures that public consumption falla to make room
for oare public abatement. Second, the effect of direct crowding out on labour supply (i.e. e~ should be
large relative to the uncompensatecl wage elasticity of labour supply (q„). In that case, the positive labour-
supply effnct of lower puhlic consumption dominates the negative labour-eupply effect asaociated with a
higher oversll tax nte.
71te possibility of a rice in employment in response to greener preferences can be interpreted as
follows. More concem for the environment induces substitution away from the public good of ordinary
public consumption, which is a perfect subatituta for private consumption, towanl the public goad of the
envimnmact, which is separable from private consumption. Henca, private consumption, and hence labour
supply, rise to nwke up fiir the lower proviaion of public goods that aro aubstitutes for private consumption
(i.e. public ccxuumption).
The first condition for an 'employment' double dividend reveals that the 'employment' and 'eacial'
double dividends exclude each other. In particular, the 'employment' double dividend requires a daclina in
public consumptian. Intuitively, direct crowding out boosts employment only if public coosumption dxlinea.
A'social' double dividend requires a decline ia employment. In this case, public abatement daea not riae
much, thereby allowing room for expancling public consumption. 7icis implies that environmantal quality caa
not ímprove muc:h through puhlic ahatemnnt. Hence, r Fktter environrt~ental quality has to be achieved
mainly by r~xlucing the level of employment and output, theroby cutting emissions. 7Le 'social' double divi-
dend is thua compatible with thr pessiinisric view, which arguea that a higher environmental quality requirea
a lower level of ecooomic activity. The 'otnployment' double dividend, in contrast, ia consistmt witó the
oprrmisrJc view, which says that a higher level of economic activity ia competible with a better quality of thetl
environment. Under tba optimistic view, tha environment is enhanced through a cleaner compoaitioa of
ecAnomic activity (i.e. a higher level of abatement) ntlror thm a lower levd of that activity. In fact, the
level of employment and activity nuy rise.
It is also poasible that neither an 'employment' nor a'social' double dividend oxurs. This is the
case if direct crowding out is weak and at the same time the praluctivity of public abatement daea nat fill
rapidly (i.e. both Ea and a~ are small). In this scenario, environmenW quality improves through botó a
lower level of economic activity and a higher level of public abatement.
8. Conclusion
A graater concam for tha environmeat implies a higher non-distortionary level of tha tax rata. Thia
allowa for t higher tax nte, theroby boosting public spending. If the productivity of abatement declinea
tapidly, the additional revanues are used mainly for public consumption. Environmental quality muat thea
itr~rova moatly through a lowar level of praluction and emissions nther than through a higher lavd of
abatamant. Under this acenario Irbour supply and private consumption fall due to boN a higher level of
public consumption (i.e. diract crowding out) and substitution towards leisure on account of a lower
consumer wage. Conventional environrrental policy in the form of public abatement ia thus aided by direct
crowding out. However, if public abatement romains very effective, the additional public revenues aro used
for public ahatemrnt ralhu than for puhlic ccxtsumption. In fact, in this lattcr casa, public amsumption may
fall in otsler to create room for public almtement in which caso direct crowding in attenuatas the fall in
labour supply and the leval of economic activity. Hence, public abatement ia hampercd by the adverae
effacts ofcrowding in on environmental quality.
If the waga elasticity of lalwur supply is small, the effects of direct crowding in are atrong, and the
productivity of public abatement does not taper off quickly, the 'amployment' double dividond hypothesis,
i.e, greener preferences baiat both environmental yuality and tha level of employmrnt, can be givea
aupport, albeit at the expensa of a lower lavel of public consumption (i.e. no 'social' double dividend).
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Appendix: Privale abatanent and pollution taxes
Hero we briefly provide an alternative spocification of our model. Let A stand for private rather
then public abatement, and let tN denote an explicit pollution tax nte. Also, let t~ stand for m employen'
rather than an employees' tax nte. ln thst case, profits of finns aro given by:
r.(1 NL - w(1 ttJ NL - A-tN IoY~(A)J
where w denotea the wage paid to workers (i.e. the consumer wage) and w(1 ttJ is the cost per unit of
Ia1Kwr (i.e. Ihe pnxlucCr wage). Maximisaliim of profits yields:
w - ~(1-tn,a)1(IttJ and e'(A) - llt„.
Hencn, profits aro givrat by:
x - I(C(A)lA) - e'(A)J ~ A.
The hou.eehold budget constraint is wLt(x~N)-C and the govemment budget constnint gives G~ttwNL t
tN[nY~(A)J. It is stnightforward to demonstnte to show that yields the same reults for the levels of
abatemr.nt (A), public consumption (G), and private consumption (NC). The main differeace compared to
the case with public abatement is that the oóaenrd tax nte on labour (tJ is lower thaa the tax nte with
public abatement (t) as clean-up activities occur in the private sector. Greener preferences now induco a fall
in the size of the public sector as measured by actual tax collections if the productivity of public abatetomt
doas not diminish too quickly.~





Key: A gcater preterence [or pubGc consumption causes a shift from E to E~ .
Grccncr preferences or a higber cmission output ratio shifts E to EN.
Note: Thc figurc assumes a positive wage elasticity of labour supply, else the cost curve slopes
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